The Impact of Minority Representation on Policy Outcomes: Evidence from the U.S. States by Ueda, Michiko
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125
THE IMPACT OF MINORITY REPRESENTATION ON POLICY
OUTCOMES: EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. STATES
Michiko Ueda
1 8 9 1
CA
LI
F
O
R
N
IA
 
IN
S T
IT U T E O F
 T E C
H
N
O
LO
G
Y
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 1284
March 2008
The Impact of Minority Representation on Policy
Outcomes: Evidence from the U.S. States
Michiko Ueda
Abstract
Over the last forty years, racial minorities in the United States have made substantial
progress in achieving greater representation in legislatures. However, there is surprisingly
little empirical evidence as to whether this has had any direct impact on policy outcomes.
Exploiting two instances of ‘exogenous shocks’ that led to large increases in the num-
ber of African American legislators, this paper empirically tests the relationship between
descriptive representation of minorities and substantive representation of their interests.
By examining the school district-level data from the 1970s through the late 1990s across
the United States, the paper finds statistically robust evidence that the political repre-
sentation of African Americans is associated with a more equitable allocation of state aid
to school districts, which suggests that representation of traditionally underrepresented
groups can lead to tangible changes in public policy. The results are robust to controls
for the effects of other political and demographic factors.
The Impact of Minority Representation on Policy
Outcomes: Evidence from the U.S. States ∗
Michiko Ueda
∗I am greatly indebted to Jim Snyder for his insight and encouragement. I would also like to thank
Steve Ansolabehere, Jonathan Rodden, Shigeo Hirano, Kosuke Imai, Rod Kiewiet, Tetsuya Matsub-
ayashi, Howard Rosenthal, Kenneth Shotts, Stephen Voss, and Ebonya Washington for their helpful
feedback on earlier versions of this paper, and seminar participants at Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology (Work in Progress Seminar, Identity Politics Seminar, practice job talk), California Institute of
Technology, Columbia University, Emory University, George Washington University, Harvard Univer-
sity, New York University, Princeton University, Yale University, the University of California at Davis,
the University of Minnesota, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Virginia for their
comments. William Evans and Sean Corcoran provided me with valuable advice on data set construc-
tion. Adam Ziegfeld provided superb editorial assistance. The paper was previously circulated as “Does
Minority Representation Matter for Policy Outcomes?: Evidence from the U.S. States.”
For racial minorities in the United States, the last forty years have been a struggle to achieve fair
and equal political representation. Before the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, African
Americans in the South were largely deprived of the right to vote, as well as of the right to be
represented in the legislature. Over the last forty years, this situation has dramatically improved.
Concerted efforts by federal agencies and civil rights activists have gradually removed barriers to
political participation. At the same time, racial minorities have been increasingly incorporated
into the legislative arena at both the national and state levels. The number of African American
members of Congress increased from only four in 1962 to 39 in 2000. State legislatures across the
country experienced a comparable surge; the number of state legislative seats occupied by African
Americans was a mere 168 out of 7,352 total seats in 1970. By 2000 that number had increased to
571.
While minority groups achieved greater “descriptive” representation during the forty-year period
since the Voting Rights Act, it is yet to be understood whether such an increase had any direct
impact on policy outcomes. A group’s descriptive representation in the legislative body has value in
itself, but representation becomes purely symbolic if it does not bring about policy outcomes that
reflect the interests of traditionally underrepresented groups. Such “substantive” representation
should matter a great deal for minority groups, especially when minorities have a different set
of preferences than those of the majority,1 or, more importantly, when their underrepresentation
is attributable to a history of discrimination that may also have tilted policies against minority
interests.
Have the developments of the past forty years resulted in substantive representation, rather than
just descriptive representation, for African Americans in the United States? This paper answers
that question by examining state public policy outcomes, using extensive data from 1970 to the
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late 1990s. This study departs from the past literature in a major way by estimating the impact of
minority representation on actual policy outcomes. While several other studies have measured the
impact of minority representation on legislative behavior (e.g., roll-call voting) or on an ideological
composition of the legislature, no previous work has comprehensively examined the effects of minor-
ity representation on actual policies using a credible research design.2 To fill this void, this paper
analyzes policy outcomes in an area that is of primary interest to African Americans and tests if
increased minority representation has produced important changes in public policies.
The impact of minority legislative representation on policy outcomes is not immediately obvious.
On the one hand, gaining access to a representative body provides minority groups with advocates
in the legislature. We may expect such impact to be large when groups that gain political repre-
sentation have policy preferences that are distinct from those of previously overrepresented groups.
For example, scholars have devoted significant attention to the impact of female representation,
finding that greater representation of women has had consequential effects on policy outcomes in
some areas (Besley and Case 2003 for a review). On the other hand, because these groups are likely
to constitute only a minority within a legislature, their influence on policy-making processes may
well be negligible.
In the case of racial and ethnic minorities in the United States, the fact that minority represen-
tation is usually achieved through the creation of majority-minority districts complicates the issue.
The creation of majority-minority districts can have an offsetting consequence for minorities by
shifting the ideological composition of a particular legislature to the right of the political spectrum
(e.g. Swain 1993, Lublin 1997, but also see Shotts 2002). This conservative shift happens because
majority-minority districts often make surrounding districts more white and more conservative (be-
cause minorities predominantly tend to vote Democratic). Thus, as long as minority representation
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is attained through racial redistricting, minority representation may well hurt minorities, in spite of
the ostensibly benign intentions associated with the creation of such districts. Similarly, as a result
of race-conscious districting, white legislators may no longer find it necessary to be responsive to
minority concerns, if minorities are removed from their districts to newly-created majority-minority
districts. In sum, the net effect of minority representation is not immediately obvious when it is
achieved through racial redistricting. Although racial redistricting might result in a small gain in
the number of minority legislators, the potential conservative shift may outweigh the benefits for
minorities.
In addition, empirical results on the effects of minority representation have been inconclusive at
best. Past studies typically examine Congressional roll-call voting records or the legislators’ ideo-
logical positions in order to measure the overall effects of minority representation. In an influential
study, Swain (1993) examines roll-call behavior of both black and white members of Congress and
concludes that white legislators can adequately represent minority interests. Subsequent studies
offer mixed evidence in support of her findings (Bullock 1995, Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran
1996, Lublin 1997, and Canon 1999). Meanwhile, returning to the issue of racial redistricting,
Shotts (2003) shows that there is no perverse effect to this redistricting practice; the fraction of
southern legislators who are to the left of the House median increased, rather than decreased, after
the creation of majority-minority districts in the early 1990s (but also see Lublin and Voss 2003).
Finally, in a careful and thoughtful analysis, Canon (1999) examines various types of legislative
activities aimed at representing black interests (e.g. bill sponsorship and floor speeches) and finds
that black members of Congress are more responsive to minority concerns compared to white leg-
islators. Although these past studies are suggestive, what they lack is evidence on how minority
representation has directly affected the day-to-day lives of minorities. Changes in roll-call behav-
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ior may constitute one form of change, but it is unclear to what extent these changes alter the
historically disadvantaged position of minority groups in the United States. To assess the effects
of political representation in a more direct manner, this paper examines actual policy outcomes,
rather than legislative behavior of representatives.
To empirically measure the impact of minority representation, I create a panel data set that
includes information on both the number of minority state legislators as well as on state policy
outcomes in all contiguous states from 1970 to the late 1990s. The policy area that I examine is
public education finance and the unit of analysis is public school district. Two observations motivate
the decision to study school finance. First, there is a large funding disparity between districts with
low minority enrollment and those with high minority enrollment because the funding level highly
reflects property values in districts. School districts with a large number of minority students,
particularly urban districts, often lack a tax base to provide sufficient funding for education. Despite
efforts to tax themselves at a higher rate, high minority enrollment districts’ per-pupil expenditures
are still fewer than those of wealthy school districts that are typically located in suburban areas
and have a low enrollment of minority students (U.S. Dept. of Education 1998). Second, nearly
half of the revenues available to public school districts come from state governments, meaning that
state-level education finance policy is a highly influential policy area that can greatly affect the
conditions of school districts and their students.3
Representing constituencies that face disadvantages in raising local funds, minority legislators
may try to reduce the funding gap by allocating more state funds to minority or poor districts, to
supplement their scarce property tax incomes. My empirical results suggest this is indeed the case.
In states where African Americans gained greater representation, high minority enrollment districts
saw a greater increase in state aid compared to high minority enrollment districts in states where
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African Americans remained underrepresented in the state legislature.
More specifically, by regressing changes in the level of state aid to school districts on changes
on the degree of minority representation, I examine whether the increased presence of minority
policymakers changed the way that states distributed financial resources to local school districts.
Since the adequacy of education funding correlates highly with the racial composition of districts,
if minority representation matters in a substantive sense, then the amount of intergovernmental
transfers to minority districts should increase once minorities achieve greater representation. I do
not specify mechanisms through which minority legislators influence education-finance policies, nor
do I observe actual legislative processes (such as their committee assignments or the size of the
black caucus). Thus the empirical result presented here constitutes an indirect piece of evidence
on the policy impact of minority representation. However, the subsequent section contains various
forms of robustness checks in order to ensure that I do not erroneously attribute the policy shift to
minority representation when other factors are in fact driving the results.
One of the potential problems associated with explaining public policy by the level of minority
representation is the possible endogeneity of the black representation variable that appears as a
regressor. If some unobservable characteristics of a particular state (for example, state ideology)
determines both the number of black legislators and the generosity of state education finance poli-
cies, then the estimated effects are likely to be biased. For instance, if liberal states tend to elect
more minorities and, at the same time, are more likely to enact policies that serve minority interests
(c.f. Wood and Theobald 2003), then the effects of minority representation in the legislature will be
overestimated. To deal with this issue, the specification detailed below always includes state-fixed
effects, which eliminate time-invariant state specific unobserved factors. In addition, in order to
further guard against potential endogeneity, this paper utilizes two instances of exogenous policy
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changes that led to a large growth in the number of black officeholders over a relatively short period
of time.
As described in the next section, these two events undoubtedly enhanced minority representation
for reasons that are unrelated to factors found in individual states, providing ample and exogenous
variations in the number of black elected officials. Thus, these two cases enable us to isolate the
effects of minority representation from the impact of other factors that can also move education
finance policies in the same direction. Exploiting these changes, this paper finds that increased
minority representation is associated with greater targeting efforts to direct more aid to minority
and poor school districts by the state government. Therefore, the empirical results indicate that
minority representation bears more than symbolic meaning.
Historical Background: The Voting Rights Act and its Impact
This section briefly describes the development of the Voting Rights Act and a series of important
Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s and 1980s.4 The purpose of this section is to summarize these
events and then to show how these events radically transformed the racial composition of state
legislatures, especially in the South. Since these events were national in scope, neither they nor
the rise in the number of minority legislators associated with them, were directly caused by factors
found in any individual state. This property is particularly important in order to obtain clean
identification. Two events are relevant for the purpose of this paper: (1) the transition from
multimember state legislative districts to single-member districts in several southern states in the
1970s; (2) the creation of majority-minority districts during the 1990s round of redistricting.
The first event was closely associated with the unprecedented power of the Department of Justice
to object to discriminatory practice under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Section 5 requires
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states and localities with a history of discrimination to obtain approval from the Justice Department
for any new or changed voting-related statutes (the “preclearance” requirement).5 During the 1960s,
racial gerrymandering and the extensive use of at-large multimember districts that dilute minority
voting power strength were very common in the South.6 Note that it is almost impossible for racial
minorities to get elected in this type of system, in which all candidates run at-large, because they
can never constitute a majority of the district population. For this reason, the Justice Department
objected to (i.e. did not preclear) such district plans during the 1970s round of redistricting (U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights 1975).
In addition, the following years brought many successful court cases filed by minority plaintiffs.
In 1972, a federal district court invalidated further use of multimember legislative districts in Al-
abama, at least in part to prevent minority vote dilution (Sims v. Amos). In addition, in 1973, two
important court cases (White v.Regester, Zimmer v.McKeithen) ruled that plaintiffs in vote dilution
cases do not have to provide proof of discriminatory intent and that vote dilution should instead be
judged by the “totality of circumstances” (White) or by eight factors (Zimmer). Following White
and Zimmer, the number of constitutional challenges to election procedures significantly increased
at all levels of government. At-large and multimember district systems were particularly prone to
attack.
The developments in the early 1970s led to substantial litigation and persistent intervention in
redistricting processes by the Justice Department, as well as the creation of district plans by federal
courts. These combined efforts subsequently resulted in the elimination of multimember districts
in several southern states. Louisiana introduced single-member districts in its lower house in 1972;
Alabama in 1974, South Carolina in 1975, and Mississippi in 1978. In each state, resistance by
white members of state legislatures was substantial, and it often required many years of efforts to
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dismantle discriminatory electoral laws (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1975, Hardy, Heslop, and
Anderson 1981).
The impact of the shift from multimember to single-member districts on the level of minority
representation was dramatic (Table 1). After the Alabama state house had its first legislative
election under a single-member plan in 1974, the number of minority legislators increased from
0 in 1970 to 15 in 1975. In South Carolina, when the state legislature finally adopted a single-
member district plan for its state house, the number of African Americans in the lower house rose
from 0 (1970) to 13 (1975). To illustrate the change, Table 1 reports the total number of African
Americans represented in state legislatures in 1970 and in 1980. We observe a large increase in
the number of African American legislators in states where the federal intervention successfully
lead to an introduction of single-member districts. By contrast, in the other southern states where
multimember districts were primarily used throughout the period, the increase was modest. Given
the widespread white resistance toward black officeholding during the period and the magnitude of
the resistance to the outside intervention, it is obvious that these southern states would not have
introduced single-member districts had it not been for the Department of Justice’s intervention.
Thus, the increase is clearly attributable to the outside, or exogenous, forces.
Another instance of a sudden and large increase in the number of minority legislators occurred in
the early 1990s, when a large number of states created the maximum number of majority-minority
districts during the 1990s round of redistricting. Two events contributed to this effort. First,
Congress amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to explicitly prohibit any voting
schemes that result in minority vote dilution. This meant that minority plaintiffs no longer had to
prove discriminatory purpose of election laws in order to challenge them. In addition, the language of
the new section 2 suggested that the proportion of majority-minority districts should approximate
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the share of the population consisting of minorities. That was the interpretation of the time,
although the section included a statement that it would not guarantee proportional representation.
In addition, because the section covered the entire nation (in contrast to section 5, which covered
only some states), any jurisdiction with a large minority population was now vulnerable to a section
2 challenge for minority vote dilution practice.
Second, the Supreme Court ruled in Thornburg v.Gingles (1986) that only simple factors –
mainly the existence of “racially polarized” bloc voting – would justify overturning discriminatory
electoral schemes. The decision “was enormously significant because it simplified decisions in voting
cases and added greater predicability.” (McDonald 1992: 69) Thus as long as it can be shown that
white voters and black voters vote differently, then the creation of majority-minority districts would
now be justified.
Consequently, when states started decennial redistricting processes after the 1990 census, they
were under tremendous pressure to create the maximum number of majority-minority districts
possible (e.g. Donovan 1991, Duncan 1991). In some cases, the creation of such districts was done
at the insistence of the Justice Department. Encouraged by the development in the 1980s, “the
Justice Department exercised its section 5 preclearance power extremely aggressively after the 1990
census” (Lowenstein 1998: 62).
As a result, the number of majority African American state legislative districts in states with a
black population exceeding 10 percent increased from 16 in 1990 to 50 in 1992,7 which was followed
by a great increase in the level of minority representation in a relatively short period of time.
In 1990, the number of African American legislators represented in state legislatures around the
country was 404, but it grew significantly to 509 in 1992, and it reached 566 by 1996 – a 40 percent
increase since 1990. Under the threat of litigation and intervention (and actual intervention by
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the DOJ), states with a large minority population had no choice but to create majority-minority
districts. The increase was largely due to the events at the national level, rather than voluntary
efforts to elect minority state legislators.
Data and Methods
Specification
The key public policy variable analyzed in this paper is the total amount of state aid per pupil
received by school districts. When available, the amount of per-pupil general aid formula assistance
revenues (which is a subset of total state aid) in the district is also used as the dependent variable.8
If minority representation matters, one should see an increase in state transfers to high minority
enrollment districts once more minorities are represented in state legislatures.
The main equation to be estimated is:
∆yijt = α0 + α1∆[BlackRep]it ∗ [%Black]ij + α2[%Black]ij +∆wijtβ + γi + uijt, (1)
where yijt is the per-capita amount of state transfer defined above and wijt is a vector that contains
characteristics of district j in state i, and ∆yijt = yijt−yij,t−1 and ∆wijt = wijt−wij,t−1. Thus, the
dependent variable is the change in the amount of state transfers. [BlackRep]it is the percentage
of seats occupied by African American legislators in the state legislature of state i in time t (see
below). [%Black]ij is the percentage of African American pupils in the district, and it is held
constant over time. This is because I am interested in the extent to which minority districts (with
a given minority population) benefit from the change in the level of minority representation. It
is also because there is little variation in the variable over time at the school district level. wijt
is other characteristics of districts that can affect levels of state aid, such as district enrollment,
the number of schools, household median income, property tax income, educational attainment of
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adults, poverty level, and the percentage of population living in urban areas. γi is a state-fixed
effect, which captures time-invariant unobservable characteristics of each state, such as baseline
state ideology or the state’s education system. With γi, the main black representation term (∆
BlackRep) is absorbed. Note that the size of the main effects (i.e. intercepts) is not of interest here.
The focus of this paper is to see how states’ responsiveness to the size of minority enrollment (i.e.
slope) differs when there is an increase in the level of black representation, compared to when there
is no change in minority representation. In addition, interpreting the main effects would also be
difficult with state fixed effects, whose coefficients include the effect of other unobservable variables.
Thus, the regressor of interest is the interaction term: ∆[BlackRep]it ∗ [%Black]ij. The esti-
mated coefficient on the interaction term measures the impact of minority representation on the
funding level of districts, which is assumed to be a function of minority enrollment. If black districts
benefit from having minority legislators in the state legislature, α1 is expected to be positive. An-
other possibility is that minority legislators advocate the interests of poor districts, not just those
of minority districts and try to target state funding to poor districts. This possibility arises be-
cause African American legislators’ main constituency, African Americans, tend to be economically
disadvantaged. Consequently, black legislators represent relatively poor districts. According to the
author’s tabulation of the state legislative district-level data in the 1990s, the average household
income of state house districts that are represented by African American legislators was 29,246.60
dollars, while that of districts represented by non-Hispanic white legislators was 37,650.25 dollars.9
To check if the rise in minority representation is associated with greater targeted funding to
poorer districts, I also interact the fraction of black legislators with district poverty, measured by
the percentage of population living below the poverty line. The coefficient on this interaction term
measures the extent to which poor districts benefit from the increase in minority representation.
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Data
This section explains the principal sources of data in this study. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics.
The dependent variable is the amount of state funds allocated to U.S. public school districts over
time. Thus, all the data are measured at the school district level, except for the state-level legislative
data. Using three sources of data, I created a school district-level panel data set that contains
demographic, financial, and non-financial information on school districts across the United States
from 1970 to 1999. Then the data set was merged with state legislative information. The years
included in the analysis are 1970-72, 1980-82, and 1990-1999. The Data Appendix contains more
detailed descriptions of the data and the definitions of variables.
Basic demographic information for each school district was taken from school district tabulations
of the Censuses of Population and Housing (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000). The demographic variables
include total population, population by race, the fraction of black students (%Black), median house-
hold income (Median Income, in 1990 dollars), the percentage of population living in poverty (%
Poverty), living in the urban area (% Urban), 65 years and older (65 yrs+ old), educational attain-
ment of the adults (the percentage of adult population with at least 12 years of education (12+ yrs
schooling) and with at least 16 years of education (16+ yrs schooling)). When available, the per-
cent of Hispanic enrollment (% Hispanic) and the percent of pupils receiving free or reduced-price
lunches (% Free Lunch) are included in the analysis as control variables.
The sources of school finance data are the Censuses of Governments (1972, 1982) and the
Survey of Local Government Finances for School Systems, known as the F-33 data (1992-1999).
The financial data include the amount of intergovernmental transfers from the state government
and local property tax revenue. After 1992, detailed information on the nature of state funds is also
available and the data set contains a detailed breakdown of state funds from 1992 through 1999.
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All financial data are expressed in constant 1990 dollars.
Finally, non-financial school district information is obtained from Elementary and Secondary
General Information System (ELSEGIS) data (1972-1973, 1979-1980) and the Common Core of
Data (the 1990s), created by the National Center for Educational Statistics. The data include total
enrollment (Enrollment), the number of schools (No. of Schools), district types (operating/non-
operating), and the grade span. The non-financial data are used to calculate per-capita measures,
as well as to exclude outliers in the sample (see Data Appendix).
Each school district has a unique 7-digit NCES and 9-digit census identification number. For
each year, the three types of data sets – demographic, financial, non-financial – were carefully
merged by one of the ID numbers. When matching by the IDs did not work for some districts, they
were carefully merged manually by state and district names. Next, the merged school district data
were combined with state-level legislative information. The variable of interest in this study is the
share of state legislative seats occupied by African American members (BlackRep). It is calculated
as the total number of black legislators in both the lower and upper houses divided by the total
number of state legislative seats in each state.
To check for the possibility that other political factors are affecting policy outcomes, I also
collected data on the seat share of Democrats (% Democrats) and an indicator variable for the
Democratic party’s control of the governorship. The number of African American legislators is
reported in various volumes of Roster of Black Elected Officials and the other legislative information
is obtained through the ICPSR.
The data sets were then merged across time. I created two sets of data: one that contains the
1970 and 1980 data and another that contains the 1990s data. The demographic data are available
only in the census years, so the financial information in 1972 was merged with the 1970 census
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data, as well as with legislative and non-financial district information in 1970. Similarly, financial
information in 1982 was matched with the demographic, legislative, and district data in 1980. As
for the data in the 1990s, since the annual F-33 data do not report values for all districts in some
years, I first made two sets of financial data by taking the average of two or more years (1992-1993
and 1997-1999) and then merged the averaged 1992-1993 data with the 1990 census data and the
averaged 1997-1999 financial data with the 2000 census data. The non-financial data were merged
in a similar fashion. The legislative information in 1990 was used for the first period and data from
early 1997 were used for the second period. For the analysis of the 1990s event, the data contain
values in the late 1990s minus those in the early 1990s. For the 1970s analysis, the 1970 data are
subtracted from the 1980 data.
Estimation Results
The 1970s
As explained in Section 2, several southern states experienced a large exogenous increase in the
levels of minority representation during the 1970s. Thus, I analyze public elementary and secondary
school districts in the South (N=1,761) in this part of the analysis. Southern states were still quite
distinct from the rest of the country during this period, and limiting the sample to southern states
would facilitate comparison. In order to see if there exists any clear pattern between states that
were subjected to outside intervention and those that were not, I estimate the following equation
in this section, which is a simplified version of equation (1):
∆yijt = α0 + α1[Reform]i ∗ [%Black]ij + α2[%Black]ij +∆wijtβ + γi + uijt, (2)
where ∆yijt is the change in state aid per pupil between 1972 and 1982. [Reform] is a dummy
15
variable that takes a value of 1 if a state satisfies the following three conditions (see Table 1): (1) its
state legislative districts were switched to single-member districts because of outside intervention,
(2) covered under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and (3) in the Deep South. Again, the main
identification problem is that states with relatively liberal ideology tend to elect more minority
legislators, and at the same time are more likely to enact policies that benefit minority population.
This definition of the Reform variable ensures that the increase in minority representation was
brought about against their will, thereby minimizing the above concern that can bias the estimates.
Alabama, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Mississippi satisfy the above conditions and there are 412
school districts in these ‘reform’ states.10
Going back to Eq. (2), [%Black] is the percentage of black pupils in the district in 1970. In order
to take into account potential correlations within states, all standard errors are clustered by states.
Note that by clustering standard errors by states, the multi-level nature of data structure is taken
into account and that the estimates are statistically equivalent to those obtained by estimating a
multi-level model (e.g. Steenbergen and Jones 2002). All specifications include state-fixed effects.11
Table 3 reports the estimation results. The dependent variable in all columns is the change in
intergovernmental transfer to a public school district from 1972 to 1982. If black representation
has any positive effect on the distribution of funds to minority districts, the coefficients on the
interaction terms are expected to be positive.
Column (1) reports estimated coefficients for the simplest specification, and column (2) contains
an estimation result for a more complete model. In both columns, the coefficients on the interaction
term (Reform * % Black) are positive and statistically different from zero, suggesting that the
southern states that had a large increase in African Americans in the legislature transferred more
state aid to districts with high minority enrollment, compared to other southern states that did not
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experience such a change.
Next, I test whether the increased presence of African Americans in state legislatures is also
associated with an increase in state aid to poor school districts. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3
report estimation results when [Reform] is interacted with % Poverty. In contrast to columns (1)
and (2), the coefficients in columns (3) and (4) are not statistically significant, and the magnitude
is much smaller. This implies that the impact of minority representation on the funding level of
economically disadvantaged school districts is negligible. Note, however, that this result is in sharp
contrast to the estimation results for the 1990s (see below).
In sum, the results in Table 3 suggest a positive link between the level of black representation
and the level of state funding efforts to minority districts. The pattern holds even after controlling
for districts’ needs and state-specific factors. However, there does not seem to be significant effects
of minority representation on the conditions of poor districts during the 1970s.
The 1990s
The estimation results for the 1970s period suggest that changes in the racial composition of leg-
islatures can bring about a tangible shift in state policy outcomes. However, the dramatic rise in
black representation was limited in several southern states during this period, thereby leaving us
with a limited opportunity to measure the impact of minority political representation. To further
investigate the more general effects of minority representation on policy outcomes, I exploit another
instance of a sharp rise in minority representation in the early 1990s associated with the creation
of majority-minority districts.
Table 4 presents estimation results of equation (1) for the 1990s period. The dependent variable
is the amount of total state aid per pupil in columns (1)-(3) and the amount of general formula
assistance per pupil in columns (4)-(6). The funds distributed through the general aid formula are
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a subset of the total state aid and non-categorical, whereas the total amount includes funds for
categorical programs, such as compensatory and basic skills programs, school lunch programs, and
capital outlay program revenues (such as for construction).
I employ three different specifications to estimate the effects. In columns (1) and (4), the change
in the level of black representation (∆ BlackRep) is interacted with the percentage of black pupils
in the district (% Black). The ∆ BlackRep variable is interacted with the percentage of population
living in poverty (% Poverty) in columns (2) and (5). Again, I expect the coefficients on these
interaction terms to be positive, if the presence of African American legislators is associated with
positive changes in the way states distribute state aid to high minority enrollment or poorer districts.
In columns (3) and (6), both of the interaction terms are included in order to measure the relative
impact of minority representation on minority and poor districts. Although these two types of
districts often overlap, the correlation between the two is not high at the school district level (the
correlation coefficient for 1997 is 0.3984 (N=9,624)), therefore we should be able to estimate the
impact separately for each type of district. To account for other factors that can affect the level of
state aid, a set of regression controls are also included.
In Table 4, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are all positive and statistically
different from zero. The results suggest that increased black representation is associated with higher
funding levels for both poorer and high minority school districts. The coefficients in columns (1)
and (4) are almost identical in magnitude, suggesting that black representation has a similar impact
on both the level of total state aid and the amount of general formula assistance. Column (5) shows
that black representation has less impact on the level of general formula assistance than on the
amount of total state aid (column (2)). Since modifying aid formulas should be more challenging
than distributing discretionary funds to districts (which appear in the amount of total state aid),
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the result is consistent with what we would expect.
The substantive results remain the same when I include two sets of interaction terms (columns (3)
and (6)), but the size of coefficients varies slightly across different specifications. Column (3) shows
that the impact of black representation on the level of total state aid for minority districts is lower
(0.292) when the two interaction terms are included, compared to when only the minority district
interaction term is included (column (1), 0.651). Meanwhile, the coefficient on the % Poverty times
black representation term remain quite stable across columns (2) and (3), with a size of about 1.4.
In column (6), the interaction term with the percent poverty is statistically indistinguishable from
zero, suggesting that the specification in column (5) potentially suffers from an omitted variable
bias. Nevertheless, the estimated coefficient on the % Black times black representation term is not
affected by the inclusion of the other interaction terms (see column (4) and (6)).
Taken together, the estimated results indicate that the level of minority representation in the
1990s positively affected the funding level of minority and poor districts. Both in the 1970s and
1990s, the presence of black state legislators is associated with states’ greater targeting efforts to
the neediest districts. In order to verify the robustness of these findings, next I turn to several
alternative explanations for the outcomes observed in this section.
Robustness
The empirical results presented above strongly suggest that the rise in black representation in
the 1970s and 1990s was followed by policy outcomes that benefited disadvantaged school districts.
The estimates are robust to controls for factors that are known to affect school finance policies and
to district- and state-specific factors. This subsection presents additional checks of the robustness
of the results.
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Effect of Mandated School Finance Reform
Since the early 1970s, interdistrict funding inequality has led less wealthy districts to challenge the
constitutionality of school finance systems in various states, based on a claim that the large funding
gap violated the state constitution. As of 1998, state supreme courts in various states declared
their education funding system unconstitutional, thus requesting their legislatures to adopt more
equitable school finance system. One may argue that the improved funding status of disadvantaged
districts is due to court orders, not due to the presence of African American legislators who tend
to represent such districts. Although the timing of the rulings and that of the rise in minority
representation do not coincide (since each state supreme court issued rulings at different time) and
also the outcomes of litigation and the level of minority representation are unlikely to be related, it
is worth isolating the impact of mandated school finance reforms from that of minority legislators.
In order to examine the impact of minority representation separately from that of court in-
tervention, I split the sample into two groups: (a) states that had no litigation, or those where
state supreme courts found their education finance system constitutional, and (b) states where the
system was ruled unconstitutional by the courts.12 I then estimate equation (1) for each group to
see if any distinct pattern exists between the two. If court orders are primarily driving the previous
results, positive coefficients on the interaction terms should be observed only for the states where
the education finance system was ruled unconstitutional. This would then suggest a spurious rela-
tionship between the level of minority representation and increased funding levels for the neediest
districts. If, on the contrary, the presence of black legislators has a distinct effect on education
policy outcomes, then one should see positive coefficients on the interaction terms even if no edu-
cation finance reform was mandated by the courts. In fact, one can expect the effect of minority
representation to be larger when there was no court intervention. This is because the court rulings
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would prompt the legislature to address the fiscal disparity issue, regardless of its willingness to do
so, thus making political factors largely irrelevant.13
In Table 5, I present estimation results for states with no court intervention in panel (a), and
panel (b) contains estimation results for states where education finance systems were ruled un-
constitutional. All specifications include the same set of control variables as in Table 4, as well
as state-fixed effects. Comparing panel (a) and panel (b), it is clear that the effect of minority
representation is estimated to be more prominent in states with no court intervention. The coeffi-
cients on the interaction terms in panel (a) are all positive and statistically different from zero (at
5 percent significance level, one-tailed test). In addition, the magnitude of the coefficients are quite
comparable to those in Table 4. Contrastingly, most of the estimated coefficients in panel (b) are
either statistically indistinguishable from zero or have the wrong sign. The only exception is the
estimated impact of black representation on the amount of total state aid to poorer districts, which
is positive and statistically different from zero (column (2) and (3), panel (b)). Overall, there does
not seem to be any evidence that court-ordered school finance reforms are primarily driving the
results.
Effect of Partisan Factors
Another check is to see if the estimated positive impact of minority representation is robust to the
effects of other political factors, such as partisan control of the legislature. One may be concerned
that the increase in African American legislators coincided with an increase in the number of
Democrats in state legislatures, and that such partisan shifts, rather than the rise in black legislators,
is responsible for more equitable education finance systems. While it is true that most minority
representatives are Democrats, increased minority representation does not necessarily translate
into an increased seat share for the Democratic party. This is most clearly illustrated by the
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Republican party seat gains across the country in the mid-1990s, both at the national and state
levels, despite the large increase in black representation. In order to formally abstain from the
effect of such confounding political factors, I add the percentage of Democratic legislators and an
indicator variable that measures the partisan control of the governorship to the model. Because
partisan factors are largely irrelevant in the South during the 1970s, I estimate modified equations
only for the 1990s period.14
The estimation results show that the positive impact of minority representation is robust to the
effects of other political factors. The estimated coefficients on the ∆ BlackRep interaction term are
still positive and statistically different from zero, even after controlling for the effect of the partisan
control of the state legislature and governorship. In addition, the magnitude of the coefficients is
quite comparable to the estimation results in Table 4. I also estimate the effect separately by the
litigation status of states, and the results again confirm the previous conclusion. Thus, the observed
outcomes are not attributable to changes in other political factors.
Effect of School Desegregation
Another potential alternative explanation for the 1970s results is that school desegregation pro-
ceeded somehow more quickly in the ‘reform’ southern states during the period. Because school
integration can be costly (e.g. busing), the increased funding level found in the previous section
may simply reflect such costs, rather than efforts by minority representatives to improve conditions
of minority school districts. In order to check this possibility, I examine the rate of school integra-
tion in the South during the period, using the school-level data for the period of 1970-1982. The
restricted-access biennial data contain enrollment information by race for each public elementary
and secondary school and are provided by the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Edu-
cation. Using this school-level panel data set, I calculate a commonly-used index called the black
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exposure index to measure the rate of school integration for each school district in the South. The
index measures the exposure of black students to white students at a typical black school.15 It takes
a value of between 0 and 1, and 1 means complete racial integration. Figure 1 shows the trend in
the average value of the index. According to Figure 1, there is no evidence that school desegregation
happened more rapidly in the ‘reform’ southern states. The integration rate is fairly stable during
the 1970s and the integration rate is always higher among the ‘no-reform’ southern states.
Effect of Changing Attitudes among Voters and Politicians
One may also argue that residents – policy-makers and citizens alike – of the ‘reform’ southern
states may have softened their attitudes against African Americans during the 1970s, compared to
those residing in the ‘no-reform’ southern states and that such changing attitudes would have led
to the improved conditions of minority school districts even without the presence of black state
legislators. In order to rule out this possibility, I check the trend in citizens’ opinion regarding
African Americans as well as the trend in roll-call behavior of the Members of Congress in the
South. If the above claim is true, we should observe a distinct pattern in citizens’ attitudes or in
politicians’ voting records between the ‘reform’ and ‘no-reform’ southern states.
For the purpose of measuring citizens’ attitudes toward African Americans, I use the American
National Election Studies conducted between the late-1960s and 1982. I measure the general atti-
tude of white respondents towards African Americans by a series of feeling thermometer questions
and also by questions regarding aid to minority groups. The feeling thermometer question asks
respondents the warmness of their feelings towards African Americans and the aid to blacks ques-
tion asks respondents whether the government should help African Americans and other minority
groups to improve their social and economic positions or they should help themselves. Neither
of the measures shows strong evidence that the white respondents in the ‘reform’ southern states
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became more ‘friendly’ towards African Americans during the period of this study.16
A final check is to see if there was any noticeable change during the 1970s in legislative behavior
among policy-makers from the ‘reform’ southern states. Ideally one would examine ideological
positions of state legislators, but lacking such data, I turn to the ideological scores of the U.S. House
members instead. I examine the trend in the average DW-NOMINATE Scores (1st dimension) of
the House members from three groups of states (the ‘reform’ and ‘no-reform’ southern states, and
non-southern states) for the period of 1969-1983 (91st-98th Congresses). The representatives of
the two groups in the South were ideologically very close, and follow a similar trend during the
period. Again, there is no evidence that the ‘reform’ southern states became ideologically closer
to non-southern states relative to ‘no-reform’ southern states. The results are similar for the 2nd
dimension.
Conclusion
Despite the importance of the issue, few previous studies have investigated the impact of minority
representation on actual policy outcomes. Exploiting exogenous and large variations in the level
of minority representation in state legislatures, this paper finds that representation of traditionally
underrepresented groups can lead to tangible changes in policy outcomes. More specifically, the
central empirical findings of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, during the 1970s,
southern states that experienced a sudden surge in black representation exhibited more targeting
efforts to minority districts, thus narrowing the funding gap between black and white districts.
Such shifts were not observed in other southern states where the level of minority representation
remained low throughout the decade. Second, another large gain in minority representation in the
early 1990s was again associated with greater efforts to allocate more state funds to disadvantaged
districts. Thus, in both periods, the level of black representation is positively correlated with the
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funding level of districts with the greatest needs. These results imply the general policy impact of
African American state legislators, especially in addressing disparities in education funding.
The data set compiled for this study also reveals that the presence of racial minorities in the
legislature seemed to have positively affected minorities as a whole, not just those residing in dis-
tricts represented by African American state legislators. During the 1970s, high minority enrollment
districts in the South experienced a similarly large increase in aid from the state government regard-
less of whether they were actually represented by a black legislator or not.17 It implies that black
state legislators try to advocate on behalf of the broader interests of African Americans, rather
than merely bringing back goods to their own districts. Thus, the benefit of gaining access to the
legislative arena can be broad and general.
From this empirical analysis, I do not seek to draw any inferences regarding the merit of racial
redistricting or that of federal intervention – it is simply beyond the scope of this paper. Fur-
thermore, the empirical results of this study should not be interpreted as suggesting that white
legislators cannot adequately represent minority interests. Rather, the main message of this paper
is that legislatures that incorporate minority members of the society are more likely to adopt policies
that reflect the interests of the traditionally underrepresented groups. This by no means rules out
the possibility of the advancement of minority interests by like-minded members of the majority
group. In addition, as some authors argue, under certain circumstances it may be better for black
voters to be influential in a district represented by a white legislator, rather than being packed in
a majority-minority district. But the empirical results in this study suggest that the overall effect
of actual minority representation is positive, and not trivial. Descriptive representation of racial
minorities can result in substantive representation of minority interests. The voices of minority
groups are more likely to be heard when members of these groups are actually present and advocate
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their interests in legislatures. Thus, racial composition of legislatures does matter, not just in a
symbolic sense, but also for policy outcomes that reflect diverse interests of society.
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Endnotes
1. As is well documented, racial minorities in the United States tend to have different policy
concerns and face a distinct set of challenges in their everyday lives. As of 2000, 22 percent of
black individuals lived below the poverty level, while 7.5 percent of non-Hispanic whites lived in
such conditions (U.S. Dept. of Education 2004, p. 131). The figure is even starker for children;
30.9 percent of black children and 28 percent of Hispanic children are living below the poverty line,
while the figure for their white counterparts is 9.4 percent. The condition of public schools (such as
the quality of their physical plants) with a large minority enrollment tends to be worse than those
of schools whose students are mostly white (U.S. Dept. of Education 2000). On policy preferences,
see, for example, Tate 2003 and Kinder and Sanders 1996.
2. As described below, the biggest issue with this type of work is that the level of minority
representation can be endogenous. Previous studies fail to address the endogeneity problem (Haynie
2001, Preuhs 2006). Other related studies (that also ignore the issue of endogeneity) base their
conclusion on limited cases and examine policy areas that may be largely symbolic or has limited
impact (such as hiring of minority teachers and administrators) (e.g. Meier and England 1984,
Meier, et. al. 2005).
3. State and local funding play a much larger role in school finance than federal aid. As of 1990,
93 percent of the revenues for elementary and secondary school districts come from state and local
sources (U.S. Dept. of Education 2004).
4. For more complete description of the background, see, for example, Davidson 1992, McDonald
1992, and Davidson and Grofman 1995, Lowenstein 1998, O’Rourke 1998.
5. They are originally six southern states (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Car-
olina, and Virginia) and parts of North Carolina. States that employed a literacy test (or similar
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device) and had a registration rate of less than 50 percent of the voting age population as of 1964
were subject to the section 5 preclearance requirement.
6. Multimember districts are used in conjunction with other requirements (such as the numbered
post, full-slate requirement, or candidate residence requirement) to further dilute minority voting
power strength.
7. Calculated by the author based on the percent of majority African American districts provided in
Handley, Grofman, and Arden 1998. The number in 1990 does not contain the number of majority-
black districts in Arkansas and New Jersey and the number in 1992 does not include the number
of majority-black districts in Alabama, because Alabama did not finish redistricting by 1992.
8. General aid formula assistance revenues are general non-categorical assistance from the state
government. Each state employs a different formula and states use complicated, and often mul-
tiple, funding formulas to allocate state funds to local school districts. Types of general formula
programs include foundation program, minimum or basic formula support, power equalization, vari-
able guarantee plans, flat or block grants. Examples of items included in the total state aid, but
not in general formula assistance, are: funds for special education programs, transportation, staff
improvement, compensatory and basic skills programs, school lunch programs, bilingual programs,
and capital outlay for school construction and building aid.
9. The method of calculation and data sources available upon request.
10. Georgia is a borderline case as it satisfies condition (2) and (3), and its legislative districts
were switched to mostly single-member districts, especially in areas where African Americans are
concentrated. The previous version of the paper included Georgia in the ‘reform’ states, and the
inclusion of Georgia does not change any of the substantive results below. The Georgia Legislature
adopted some single-member house districts in several urban counties in response to a court decision
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in 1965, which explains its relatively high level of black representation in 1970.
11. The specification also includes the change in the black enrollment (∆%Black). Excluding the
∆%Black does not substantively affect the coefficient estimates of other variables, including the one
on the interaction term.
12. They are CA, NJ, CT, WA, WV, WY, AR, TX, KY, MT, TN, AL, MA, NH, VT, OH, and SC.
Information is as of 1998.
13. However, it should also be noted that the court ruling itself does not automatically bring about
equitable funding system, therefore political factors can still play a major role. State supreme courts
merely direct the legislature to improve upon the existing system, and actual reforms are subject to
legislative action and approval. Not surprisingly, one can find cases in which the court orders failed
to bring successful changes in education finance systems because of legislative gridlock. See Carr
and Fuhrman 1999. The overall impact of court ordered reform on funding equity is estimated to
be positive (Murray, Evans, and Schwab 1998).
14. Results available upon request.
15. It is defined as Ej =
∑
i
[
pWij ×
(
nBij
nBj
)]
, where where j denotes school district, i denotes school,
pWij is the fraction of white pupils in school i in school district j, n
B is the number of black pupils
(e.g. Welch and Light [1987]).
16. Details available upon request.
17. Details available upon request.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics – Unweighted District Means
1970-1972 1980-1982 1990-1993 1997-2000
% black state legislators (All states) 3.554 5.358 6.231 8.092
% black state legislators (South) 1.439 6.795 8.992 13.175
% black enrollment 7.042 – 7.519 7.941
% black in district population 5.609 5.531 5.411 5.789
State transfer per pupil (total) 1292.19 2117.92 2440.50 2956.11
State transfer per pupil (formula aid) – – 1818.43 2303.20
Per capita property tax revenue 304.76 312.48 326.71 309.66
Median household income (thousands) 19.117 25.085 26.086 32.339
% population living under poverty 13.903 13.092 14.143 12.053
% population living in urban area 33.283 35.541 36.341 40.745
% Hispanic enrollment – – 5.441 6.516
% population with 12 yrs+ Schooling 47.947 64.334 73.270 79.721
% population with 16 yrs+ Schooling 7.529 10.401 13.872 17.921
% pupils with free/reduced-price lunch – – 25.600 27.443
% population over 65 years of age – – 14.457 14.428
Enrollment 3612.6 3549.6 3720.5 4065.6
Number of schools in district 7.59 7.22 7.18 7.62
Number of observations 8109 8109 9624 9624
Notes: Data represent the U.S. elementary and secondary public school districts in 47 states (districts in
Alaska, Hawaii, DC, and Nebraska not included). All dollar amounts are in 1990 dollars. Cells are left
empty when data are not available in the corresponding year. % Black Enrollment in the 1980s is available
only for the southern states.
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Table 3
Effect of Minority Representation on Levels
of State Aid in ‘Reform’ Southern States: 1972-1982
Dependent variable: changes in state aid per pupil
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Black * Reform 3.262 2.989
(1.578) (1.446)
% Poverty * Reform 0.602 -0.208
(3.297) (3.361)
% Black 2.173 2.092
(0.969) (0.789)
% Poverty 7.465 11.780
(1.275) (1.862)
∆ % Black 4.259 3.645
(2.478) (2.041)
∆ % Poverty -0.940 11.731
(2.602) (4.479)
∆ Property Tax -0.513 -0.521
(0.053) (0.054)
∆ % Urban -0.811 -0.592
(0.542) (0.538)
∆ Median Income -3.680 5.914
(3.728) (4.559)
∆ 12 yrs+ Schooling -3.262 -2.754
(2.321) (2.032)
∆ 16 yrs+ Schooling -0.129 3.949
(4.101) (4.313)
∆ Enrollment -0.010 -0.012
(0.005) (0.005)
∆ No. of Schools -1.120 2.967
(6.426) (5.334)
Observations 1761 1756 1761 1756
R-squared 0.39 0.43 0.40 0.45
Notes: Data represent elementary and secondary public school district observations in the South from 1972
and 1982. Reform is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the “reform” southern states (AL, LA,
MS, SC). Robust standard errors (clustered by states) in parentheses. All models include state fixed effects
and weighted by district enrollment in 1970.
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Table 5 Effect of Mandated School Finance Reform on
Funding Levels of Minority Districts: 1992-1997
∆ Total State Aid ∆ Formula Assistance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(a) States where education system ruled constitutional or no litigation (N=6,027)
% Black * ∆ BlackRep 0.680 – 0.473 0.740 – 0.649
(0.072) (0.098) (0.067) (0.092)
% Poverty * ∆ BlackRep – 1.310 0.786 – 1.197 0.353
(0.197) (0.270) (0.185) (0.252)
(b) States where education system ruled unconstitutional (N=3,406)
% Black * ∆ BlackRep 0.216 – -0.509 0.185 – 0.069
(0.145) (0.174) (0.114) (0.136)
% Poverty * ∆ BlackRep – 2.075 3.062 – -0.567 -0.053
(0.364) (0.476) (0.287) (0.374)
Notes: Data represent elementary and secondary public school district observations from 1992-1993 and
1997-1999. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include state fixed effects and weighted by
district enrollment in 1990. The dependent variable in column (1)-(3) is the change in the amount of total
state transfer per pupil, and the dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the change in the amount of
general aid formula assistance per pupil. Control variables included in the estimation are: Property Tax,
Median Income, % Urban, % 12 yrs+ Schooling, % 16 yrs+ Schooling, % Free Lunch, % Hispanic, % 65
yrs+ old, and Enrollment.
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Figure 1: The Rate of School Desegregation in the South: 1970-1982
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Additional Notes/Table and Data Appendix
Notes
Page 11, Note 9: I calculate the average household income figures by matching three sets of
data. First, I enter state legislative district-level household median income data (as of 1990) from
Barone, Lilley, and DeFranco 1998. Second, I match the household income data with state legislative
election return data that contain candidate and district names (Collet 1997). Finally, information
on the race of legislators is taken from the 1993 national roster of black elected officials (Joint
Center for Political and Economic Studies 1993) and the 1994 national roster of Hispanic elected
officials (National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Education Fund 1994).
The race information is then added to the merged state legislative district-level data by candidate
and district names. Alaska, Hawaii, and Nebraska are excluded from the calculation for reasons
explained below. Idaho, Maine, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and
Wyoming had no African Americans in their respective state houses as of 1993 and are therefore
not included in the calculation.
Page 23, Note 16: The feeling thermometer ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 being more favorable
feeling. Because the sample size of southern white voters in each study is relatively small, I report
the average score of three years at the beginning of the 1970s and the 1980s. The average feeling
thermometer score among white voters in 1968, 1970, and 1972 is 55.03 for the ‘reform’ southern
states (N=277) and 57.27 for the ‘no-reform’ southern states (N=717). The average score of 1980,
1982 and 1984 is 60.09 for the former (N=240) and 61.88 for the latter group of respondents
(N=590). In the question regarding aid to blacks, respondents are asked to place themselves on
a seven-point scale. The higher value means that they think minority groups/blacks should help
themselves. At the beginning of the 1970s (1970, 1972, and 1974), the average scale of white
respondents in the ‘reform’ southern states is 4.95 (N=284), whereas the corresponding score for
1
the ‘no-reform’ southern states is 5.15 (N=614). A decade later (1980, 1982, and 1984), the score
is 4.67 (N=208) and 4.72 (N=519) for the ‘reform’ and ‘no-reform’ southern states, respectively.
During the same period, white respondents in non-southern states had the average score of 4.35
(N=3,031) in the first period and 4.44 (N=2,538) in the second period.
Page 24, Note 17: There are 28 high minority enrollment (more than 50 percent black pupils)
school districts in the ‘reform’ southern states that are represented by black legislators and 163
high minority districts that are not. The average increase in state aid for the former is 1,016.074
(s.d.=338.185) and the one for the latter is 901.546 (s.d.=393.887). In order to conduct this analysis,
I first recorded which state legislative districts were represented by black legislators (as of 1980) by
consulting Roster (1981). I then matched school districts and state legislative districts by county
names. Some counties (especially in the urban area) are represented by multiple legislators, but
I treated them as represented by black legislators if their delegation contains at least one black
legislators. This type of analysis was possible because school districts are often county-wide or
city-wide (except for Texas and Arkansas) in the South. In general, however, it is impossible to
match state legislative districts to school districts and a similar analysis could not be conducted for
the subsequent period.
2
Page 21, Note 14, Robustness Check: Effect of Partisan Factors
Table A-2: Impact of Partisan Factors on Levels of School Funding
by Litigation Status and Type of Districts: 1992-1997
All States Unconstitutional Others
Total Formula Total Formula Total Formula
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% Black*∆ BlackRep 0.359 0.554 0.120 0.198 0.344 0.640
(0.087) (0.076) (0.167) (0.131) (0.104) (0.097)
% Black*∆ Democrats -0.179 -0.062 -0.131 -0.055 -0.140 -0.054
(0.038) (0.033) (0.059) (0.046) (0.052) (0.049)
R-squared 0.73 0.80 0.51 0.75 0.80 0.84
% Poverty*∆ BlackRep 1.354 0.679 2.289 0.209 0.939 1.037
(0.222) (0.197) (0.412) (0.330) (0.271) (0.254)
% Poverty*∆ Democrats 0.065 -0.087 0.723 0.726 -0.326 -0.275
(0.099) (0.088) (0.150) (0.120) (0.139) (0.130)
R-squared 0.73 0.80 0.54 0.75 0.79 0.83
Observations 9,433 3,406 6,027
Notes: Data represent elementary and secondary public school district observations from 1992-1993 and
1997-1999. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include state fixed effects and weighted by
district enrollment in 1990. The dependent variable in columns (1), (3), and (5) is the change in the amount
of total state transfer per pupil, and the dependent variable in columns (2), (4), and (6) is the change in
the amount of general aid formula assistance per pupil. Control variables included in the estimation are:
an indicator variable ∆ Dem. Governor that takes a value of 1 if the state has a Democratic governor in
both periods, -1 if a Republican governor in both periods, and 0 if there is a switch in the party affiliation
of governor, Property Tax, Median Income, % Urban, % 12 yrs+ Schooling, % 16 yrs+ Schooling, % Free
Lunch, % Hispanic, % 65 yrs+ old, and Enrollment.
3
Data Appendix
This Appendix provides additional information on the data set and variables used in this study.
In compiling the data set, Harris [1999] was a particularly useful resource as well as Appendix in
Murray, Evans, and Schwab [1998]. In addition, William Evans and Sean Corcoran provided me
with valuable advice on data construction.
School Districts Included in the Data Set
As of 1997, there were approximately 15,000 public school districts in the United States, but after
eliminating school districts according to the following criteria, the final sample size becomes approx-
imately 9,600 for the 1990s and 8,100 for the 1970s and 1980s. To ensure comparability, the data set
only contains districts that offer both elementary and secondary schools. Non-operating districts,
districts that offer only special education, and districts whose grade level begins with grade 13 or
higher are excluded. School districts in Hawaii and the District of Columbia are not contained in
the data set since each has only one school district. Alaska and Nebraska are also excluded from the
analysis. I exclude Nebraska because its legislature is unicameral and non-partisan. Since per-pupil
revenue measures can be highly sensitive to enrollment figures for very small districts, districts with
enrollments of less than 100 are eliminated. In addition, in order to exclude extreme cases, districts
whose per-pupil revenue is more than 150 percent of the 95th percentile and less than 50 percent
of the 5th percentile (calculated for each state) are also deleted.1 Finally, school districts that are
consolidated or split are excluded from the analysis.
Additional Notes on Data Sources
Basic demographic information for each school district was taken from school district tabulations
of the Censuses of Population and Housing (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000). The district mapping data is
created by the Census Bureau and National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) by aggregating
1This algorithm is adopted from Murray, Evans, and Schwab [1998].
4
household-level decennial census data up to the school district level. The 1970 data are compiled
from the Fifth Count summary tape and Summary Tape File 3F is used for 1980. In the 1970
data, only school districts with more than 300 students are reported. The School District Data
Book (SDDB) (ICPSR version) is used for 1990 and Census 2000 School District Tabulation Data
(STP2) are downloaded directly from the Census Bureau web site. For 1970, additional information
is supplemented using Elementary and Secondary General Information System (ELSEGIS): Merged
Federal File and the district median household income is estimated from the income distribution.
Merging School District Data
The demographic data are available only in the census years, so the financial information in 1972 was
merged with the 1970 census data, as well as with legislative and non-financial district information
in 1970. Similarly, financial information in 1982 was matched with the demographic, legislative,
and district data in 1980. As for the data in the 1990s, since the annual F-33 data do not report
values for all districts in some years, I first made two sets of financial data by taking the average of
two or more years (1992-1993 and 1997-1999) and then merged the averaged 1992-1993 data with
the 1990 census data and the averaged 1997-1999 financial data with the 2000 census data. The
non-financial data were merged in a similar fashion. The legislative information in 1990 was used
for the first period and data from early 1997 were used for the second period.
The Amount of Total State Aid
The Censuses of Governments in 1972 and 1982 do not report district-level financial data for dis-
tricts in Maryland, Montana, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia. Financial data for
Montana districts are aggregated up to the state level, therefore I did not include Montana in the
1970-1980 data set. There was no black state legislators in Montana during the period. Finan-
cial data in three others states are not reported in the Censuses of Governments because school
districts in these states are dependent districts. Dependent school districts are districts that do
not raise revenues by themselves, but instead rely on a county or municipal government for their
5
financial resources. In order to supplement their financial data, I use Elementary And Secondary
General Information System (ELSEGIS): Survey Of Local Government Finances – School Systems,
1973-1974 and Elementary and Secondary General Information System, Survey of School District
Finances 1979-1980 for the four states.
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